Security Advisory – October, 2026: Compromised eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Affecting Neat Devices and Cloud Services

Advisory ID: NEAT-SA-2026-10-22-2 
Publication date: October 22, 2026 
Last updated: October 23, 2026 

Status: Neat OS 26.5.4, an emergency security hotfix, will be available in a staged rollout to all Neat devices beginning on Monday, October 26, 2026, and will reach all customers over the following days. 

Neat Pulse and Neat Open cloud service fixes are rolling out within the next two weeks. This advisory will be updated as each fix is released.

Severity: High — not independently scored by Neat. Neat has no evidence of exploitation.
CVSS vector: Not applicable — third-party certificate authority issue, not a defect in Neat code
CVE ID: None assigned to the eMudhra CA compromise itself. Related vendor fixes: CVE-2026-111943 (Go), CVE-2026-113470 (Firefox).

Summary

On October 20, 2026, Mozilla and the Chrome Root Program confirmed that the private keys of eight intermediate certificate authority (CA) certificates operated by eMudhra (emSign brand) were compromised. Neat has confirmed that the root certificates that issued these intermediates are present in the Neat OS trust store. Neat is preparing an emergency Neat OS firmware update, expected in the coming days, that removes trust in the affected certificates. Until then, customers can reduce exposure using the steps under Remediation.

Neat has also identified that certain outbound connections from Neat Pulse and Neat Open cloud services are affected. Service-side fixes are being rolled out over the next two weeks and require no customer action.

Affected Products

ProductAffected versionsFixed version
All Neat devices running NeatOS (Neat Bar, Neat Bar Generation 2, Neat Bar Pro, Neat Board, Neat Board 32, Neat Board 50, Neat Board Pro, Neat Frame, Neat Pad, Neat Pad Generation 2, Neat Pad Pro, Neat Center)All current NeatOS releasesNeat OS 26.5.4 hotfix
Refer to Remediation section below
Neat Pulse (cloud service) — outbound connections, such as webhook deliveryCurrent serviceService-side fix expected over the next 2 weeks; no customer action required
Neat Open (cloud service) — outbound connections, such as delivery of audio recordingsCurrent serviceService-side fix expected over the next 2 weeks; no customer action required

The exposure is limited to connections that Neat devices and Neat cloud services make outbound, which rely on trust stores that currently include the affected roots (see Impact).

Impact

An attacker holding one of the compromised keys and a privileged position on the customer’s network (for example, on the same network or controlling DNS) could present a forged certificate and intercept or alter TLS connections from a Neat device. This could affect device management connections, including Neat Pulse. Exploitation requires both a compromised key and an on-path network position; it does not on its own allow remote code execution.

Neat devices and Neat Pulse include built-in protections that continue to apply in this scenario:

  • Device-side remote control settings that Neat Pulse cannot override
  • In-room approval or cancellation prompts before any remote control session starts
  • A visible on-screen indicator for the full duration of a session, which can be ended from the device at any time
  • Signed firmware: Neat OS updates are verified with Neat’s own signing keys. The compromised eMudhra keys cannot be used to deliver malicious firmware to Neat devices.

Neat cloud services: Certain outbound HTTPS connections made by Neat Pulse and Neat Open cloud services also trust the affected certificates. Exploiting this would be considerably harder than the device-side scenario: an attacker would need to intercept traffic between Neat’s cloud infrastructure and the destination service, rather than on a customer network. If successful, an attacker could impersonate a destination service and receive data intended for it — for example, Neat Pulse webhook event notifications (including any bearer token or basic authentication credentials configured for the webhook), or meeting audio recordings sent by Neat Open.

Details

According to the public disclosure, the private keys were incorrectly generated by the CA, making them recoverable from the certificates themselves. The flaw has existed since the certificates were created in April 2025. A researcher reported it to the root programs on October 17, 2026; Chrome and Firefox blocked the certificates the same day, Apple on October 19 and Microsoft on October 20. eMudhra has since revoked them.

Browsers receive revocation data automatically, but embedded systems that rely on a static trust store, such as Neat OS, only stop trusting the certificates after a software update. The eight compromised intermediates are:

Intermediate CATypeChains to
EM DV TLS CA – G3BTLS, domain validatedemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM OV TLS CA – G3BTLS, organization validatedemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM EV TLS CA – G3BTLS, extended validationemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM DV TLS CA – G3CTLS, domain validatedemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM OV TLS CA – G3CTLS, organization validatedemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM EV TLS CA – G3CTLS, extended validationemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM OV CS CA – G3BCode signingemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)
EM OV CS CA – G3CCode signingemSign ECC Root CA – G3; AAA Certificate Services (Sectigo cross-sign)

Each intermediate also exists as a second certificate with the same public key, cross-signed by Sectigo under its AAA Certificate Services root. The upcoming Neat OS update will remove trust in the compromised intermediates and the roots that issued them from the Neat OS trust store, consistent with the actions taken by Mozilla and other trust-store operators.

Neat’s own update, provisioning, and Neat Pulse services do not use certificates issued by eMudhra. The exposure exists because, until the update is installed, a Neat device would accept a forged certificate for those services if it chained to one of the compromised intermediates.

Remediation

Release by Neat model:

The security fix applies to every Neat model listed below. To check your device’s current firmware build, see How to check your software and firmware version or view it in Neat Pulse. 

Neat modelPlatformPrevious build (Neat OS 26.5.3)New build (Neat OS 26.5.4)
Neat BarAndroid 10NFB1.20260810.1020NFB1.20260810.1026 
Neat BoardAndroid 10NFC1.20260810.1020NFC1.20260810.1026 
Neat Bar Generation 2Android 13NFE2.20260810.1322NFE2.20260810.1328 
Neat Bar ProAndroid 13NFD2.20260810.1322NFD2.20260810.1328 
Neat Board 32Android 15NFM2.20260810.1524NFM2.20260810.1538 
Neat Board 50Android 13NFH2.20260810.1322NFH2.20260810.1328 
Neat Board ProAndroid 13NFK2.20260810.1322NFK2.20260810.1328 
Neat FrameAndroid 13NFF2.20260810.1322NFF2.20260810.1328 
Neat PadAndroid 13NFA2.20260810.1320NFA2.20260810.1326 
Neat Pad Generation 2Android 15NFA5.20260810.1522NFA5.20260810.1534 
Neat Pad ProAndroid 15NFJ2.20260810.1524NFJ2.20260810.1538 
Neat CenterAndroid 15NFL2.20260810.1524NFL2.20260810.1538 

The Zoom Rooms, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet app versions are unchanged from Neat OS 26.5.3.

Neat Pulse and Neat Open cloud services: service-side fixes for affected outbound connections are rolling out separately, with completion expected within the next two weeks. No action is needed. We will update the security advisory when this work is complete; Neat Pulse customers using bearer token or basic authentication for webhooks may then wish to rotate those credentials.

Recommended actions until the update is available:

  • Limit network exposure: Use network segmentation and restrict Neat device outbound traffic to the endpoints listed in Neat’s network and firewall requirements. This reduces the network access an attacker would need.
  • Review remote control settings: Consider setting the device remote control option to Allowed with Confirmation or Not Allowed, particularly for devices in rooms that are frequently unattended.
  • Monitor TLS inspection logs: Organizations that perform TLS inspection can check for certificates chaining to emSign ECC Root CA – G3 or the intermediates listed above, and should ensure their own inspection appliances and trust stores are updated.
  • Rotate webhook credentials (optional): Neat Pulse customers whose webhook endpoints use bearer token or basic authentication may wish to rotate those credentials once Neat confirms the cloud service fix is complete. HMAC signing secrets are not transmitted and do not need rotation.

Note: Removing the affected roots also removes trust in legitimate certificates issued under them. After the update, a Neat device may be unable to connect to a customer-hosted service (for example, a proxy, SIP endpoint, or web application shown on the device) that uses an emSign-issued certificate. Customers in this situation should obtain a replacement certificate from a different CA.

Acknowledgements

Not applicable — this issue was not reported directly to Neat. The compromise was reported to the root programs by a researcher credited as Wayne and publicly documented by Dennis Jackson (Mozilla).

References

Contact

Questions about this advisory can be directed to security@neat.no.

Revision History

DateChange
October 22, 2026Initial publication (interim)
October 23, 2026Roll-out of Neat OS 26.5.4 Hotfix